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Abstract 
This paper reports on an ongoing comparative study of the development of digital 
radio in Europe and Canada. Focussing on the Eureka 147 Digital Audio Broadcasting 
(DAB) platform in Canada, of which it was an early adopter, the paper examines the 
complex interaction of industry, government regulation and the difficulty of policy 
formation matching the pace of technology development. Based on interviews with 
leading radio professionals, the paper presents a critical review of the ‘transitional 
policy’ towards the digitalisation of radio and examines the international market 
pressures that led Canada to largely abandon this approach in favour of the current 
multi-platform system.  Despite extensive regulatory intervention to protect Canadian 
interests, the dominant influence of the US market on Canadian broadcasting matters 
is evident. Most recently, the entry of satellite-delivered subscription radio services  
by XM Radio and Sirius have illustrated the difficulty of regulating against powerful, 
global interests.  Often seen as combining the best aspects of the European public 
service system with the commercial success of the US industry, the current stage of 
policy development in Canadian digital radio offers, it is argued, some important 
lessons for similar developments in Europe.  
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Digital technologies and the future of radio: lessons from the Canadian 
experience 
 
 
Introduction  
Radio broadcasting is poised to undergo significant transformation over the coming 
years as a number of new digital broadcasting technologies offer enhanced audio 
quality and reception, integrated data and multimedia content, and more efficient use 
of the radio spectrum.  Digital Audio Broadcasting or DAB is the most established of 
these technologies.  Developed in Europe as the Eureka-147 standard in the mid-
1980s, DAB was also adopted by Canada and widely tested in the early 1990s.  While 
the progression to digital forms of delivery is an agreed objective of the radio 
industry, there is less consensus on whether DAB offers the best means of achieving 
this or whether there are more appropriate or expedient solutions. Patterns of 
development internationally are now quite variable:  some countries such as Canada 
continue to promote DAB, but others, such as Ireland, are delaying implementation or 
even withdrawing earlier deployments. Some ten years after its inception, the progress 
of DAB internationally has been patchy and broadcasters and regulators are now 
evaluating a number of other approaches to the realisation of a fully digital radio 
landscape.   
 
The current paper, building on a comparative approach to the study of the roll out of 
digital radio developed within the Digital Radio Cultures in Europe research group 
(DRACE), reports on the situation in Canada. The paper traces the background to the 
deployment of digital radio in Canada and examines the prospects for a successful 
implementation of Digital Audio Broadcasting. It reports also on alternative 
technology platforms impacting on digital radio in Canada and examines some of the 
key environmental factors for digital radio, including the regulatory regime,  
availability and deployment of technology platforms, economic and market 
considerations, as well as audience interest and adoption.  Based on fieldwork 
conducted in Canada in 2005 during which key radio professionals and industry 
analysts were interviewed,  this paper offers a report on the situation up to the end of 
2005 when the first new subscription-based digital satellite services were launched.1   
It is argued that Canada offers a particularly useful example for comparative purposes 
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due in part to its tradition of public service broadcasting based on European models, 
as well as the leading role given to the regulator in developing policies designed to 
support Canada’s role as a world player in digital technologies.  
 
The introduction of digital radio, regardless of the system or platform adopted, offers 
many opportunities and significant challenges for broadcasters and policy makers 
alike.  While the technical advantages of digital radio broadcasting have been amply 
demonstrated, the business case is largely unproven and the future viability of any one 
approach uncertain. A comparative approach, therefore, is a useful means of 
analyzing the issues involved and potentially offers insights into the factors that will 
most impact on the emerging digital landscape. Comparing the respective issues and 
prospects for digital radio broadcasting in Canada and Europe provides an ideal 
opportunity to examine questions of policy formation and implementation in quite 
contrasting radio environments though with some underlying common features. 
Canada and Europe share strong public service traditions in broadcasting through a 
variety different economic models. In the case of Canada and Ireland, both support 
vibrant private, commercial radio sectors with high levels of listenership.  They have 
as near neighbours major broadcast markets which impact strongly on the domestic 
context and in part constrain the opportunity for development.   
 
 
Competing platforms for digital radio 
Radio, the oldest of electronically broadcast mass media,  stands at a particularly  
interesting point in its development in the early twenty first century.  Digital means of 
broadcasting offer new opportunities for value-added content, enhanced quality and 
more efficient use of the radio spectrum (Hakanen, 1991).  The European-developed 
Eureka-147 standard known as Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) is the most 
established of the new digital audio technologies in radio but increasing use of the 
internet and satellite forms of distribution have also contributed to a significant re-
assessment of radio’s future (see Kozamernik, 2004).  Indeed, the anticipated 
widespread adoption of wireless broadband applications and the use of radio-like 
technologies to distribute multimedia content, including audio and radio on demand, 
have led some to question the future of radio at all and ask whether it will in due 
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course metamorphose into a new form of information and entertainment delivery 
(DTI, 2004).   
 
The international context for the adoption and implementation of new digital radio 
technologies is a complex one (see Barboutis, 1997; Hendy, 2000; Lax, 2003; Dick et 
al, 2003).  DAB, with the support of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was 
widely adopted in most European countries throughout the 1990s, and has also been 
deployed in Canada, Australia and in parts of South East Asia.  While not the only 
form of digital radio transmission, it has been described as the most revolutionary and 
complete system, and the first big technological change in radio since the appearance 
of FM, stereophony and transistors (Martínez-Costa, 2005). DAB’s progress has been 
slow, however, in part due to sluggish governmental and regulatory support, the initial 
unavailability of affordable receivers, and the general lack of enthusiasm on the part 
of service providers to take advantage of DAB’s potential for value-added content.  
The UK is the leading exception to this where there has been wider market acceptance 
of the standard and strong incentives for content providers to develop DAB-only 
services.  However, the decision of YLE, the Finnish public broadcaster, to shut down 
its DAB network in 2005 has sent a warning signal to the broadcast world that DAB 
long-term may not be the only digital solution.2  
 
Satellite digital radio, or SDARS has made its greatest impact in the United States 
where two companies, XM Satellite Radio and Sirius, have been licensed to provide 
SDARS services on a pay-subscription basis. Serving a potential audience of 270 
million, SDARS offers a commercial-free, digital alternative to existing radio services 
and is primarily aimed at in-car listening which accounts for some 50% of radio 
listenership in the United States. Also in the United States, the reluctance of the FCC 
(Federal Communications Commission) in the US to disrupt the established and 
highly successful FM radio market led to its decision to adopt the IBOC (In Band On 
Channel) system (Ala-Fossi, 2003).  This is an approach which integrates analogue 
and digital signals within the same transmission, thereby using existing spectrum but 
without the addition of new services. Now branded as HD Radio, or high definition 
radio, the IBOC system is something of a hybrid making the transition to digital easier 
but limiting what it can offer. Another digital radio standard aimed at the re-utilisation 
of the AM band (short, medium and long wave) is Digital Radio Mondiale (DRM). It 
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promises near FM-quality with the capacity to integrate data and text on existing AM 
frequencies.  Offering improved reception and functionality over analogue AM, DRM 
is a technically successful, non-proprietary system universal system but which one 
awaits regulatory, market and broadcaster support.  
 
While not directly a competing broadcast technology, the impact of the internet on 
radio has also been significant and use of the internet as a means of providing added 
information and on-demand services has been central to most broadcasters’ digital 
strategy (Evans, 2001).  The global reach of the internet and its widespread adoption 
in everyday life have opened new possibilities for distribution of radio content as well 
as the creation of new internet-only, online radio services.  In addition, the internet’s 
interactive features allows greater personalisation of radio content and the use of 
communicative channels such as email and discussion forums for enhanced listener 
involvement.  Internet-enhanced features may point towards some of the 
characteristics of radio’s future but are not in themselves considered by broadcasters a 
replacement of the one-way, point-to-multipoint wireless transmission that defines 
radio.  However, emerging technologies utilising digital transmission to provide 
mobile multimedia services and broadband access such as DMB (Digital Multimedia 
Broadcasting) may provide another platform for radio in the future (Kozamernik, 
2004). 
 
 
Development of Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) in Canada 
Canada, as Chouinard notes (1994: 59), has more often been a follower than a leader 
in the development of new broadcast technologies. Yet in the case of digital radio, 
Canada adopted the role of enthusiastic ‘early adopter’ and within the North 
American context led the field in digital radio broadcasting during the 1990s. As early 
as 1989, an ad-hoc advisory group under the auspices of the Canadian Association of 
Broadcasters (CAB) began to advocate the idea of a national strategy to implement 
the transition of the national broadcasting system from analogue to digital.  The group 
comprising public in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), and private 
broadcasters represented by CAB, as well representatives of the Department of 
Communications, led discussion of the various options available and organized 
demonstrations of the Eureka 147/DAB system in 1990 (Chouinard et al, 1994: 58; 
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Roman, 2006). Following the success of these trials and the enthusiasm expressed 
across the radio sector for the project, a governmental Task Force for the Introduction 
of Digital Radio in Canada was established in 1992 to advise on all relevant technical, 
policy and regulatory matters.  It issued its report in 1994, outlining detailed plans for 
the relevant coverage and service issues as well as making recommendations on the 
policy and regulatory implications.3   Digital Radio Research Inc. (DRRI), (later 
Digital Radio Roll Out Inc) was established from the original consortium of private 
broadcasters and the CBC, for the purpose of financing and managing facilities for 
digital radio research and assuming responsibility as the official body mandated to 
promote and organize public demonstrations of digital radio in Canada.   Following 
the lead of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU-R)  who in 1994 
recommended the Eureka-147 system as the global technical standard for terrestrial 
and satellite radio broadcasting, Industry Canada formally adopted  the standard for 
digital broadcasting in Canada and allocated 40MHz of spectrum for the purpose in 
the L-band range (1452-1492 MHz). 
 
From the start, digital radio broadcasting and the Eureka 147 standard was intended to 
be a replacement technology and therefore much of the planning for its 
implementation was based around compatibility with existing services. Radio was 
seen to be in a period of transition at the end of which analogue systems of 
transmission and reception would be completely replaced by digital technology.  In 
order to facilitate the transition, existing radio licence holders would be given priority 
access to the digital radio band.  The development of a new band for radio 
broadcasting was also viewed as a good way of enabling expansion in the sector.  
There was little capacity left for FM development and AM with its inferior sound 
quality could in one transition be upgraded to a much superior system.4 The policy 
governing the introduction of digital radio was published by the government 
regulator, the CRTC in 1995 and outlined a two-staged approach whereby the 
Commission would first license digital radio undertakings on this transitional basis.5  
Later, a public process would be initiated to consider all aspects of digital radio 
broadcasting in the longer term.  The policy adopted involved granting licences to all 
incumbent operators who wished to use digital facilities to provide a simulcast of their 
existing services, licences which would remain in effect until a long-term digital radio 
policy was developed.  Licence holders would have some opportunity during the 
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transitional period to develop separate programming for their digital services, limited 
to 14 hours per week.  Applications for new licences or for additional services would 
only be considered on a case by case basis and subject to Commission’s policy of 
supporting the existing radio market.  
 
Canada’s support of Euerka 147 in the L-Band was not without controversy 
(Chouinard, 1994: 60).  Its support of a wideband transmission technology was 
justified on the basis of ensuring high quality audio and maximum spectrum 
efficiency.  The choice of wideband using L-Band spectrum was in contrast to the 
approach adopted elsewhere and was justified on the basis that it would offer superior 
quality, that it wouldn’t interfere with existing AM/FM services and that it offered the 
best potential for value-added data services.  All existing AM and FM licensees were 
allocated frequencies for each in the 1452-1492 MHz L-Band and an allotment plan 
was developed in each of the major metropolitan areas to allow the digital service to 
match as closely as possible the coverage of existing stations.  This involved defining 
DAB coverage around the largest FM station within any given market and grouping 
up to 5 existing FM stations into a single multiplex.  Replacement of wide area AM 
stations was restricted to the largest equivalent, though smaller, FM coverage area.  
As a replacement technology, stations were licensed only to simulcast existing 
services and were not permitted to offer new or additional services.  Equally, no new 
licences were to be offered for the duration of the transition nor would any new 
operators be enabled to enter the market.  
 
From the industry point of view,  broadcasters expressed a commitment to the future 
of radio as digital and argued that the best course of action to develop its potential was 
an industry-wide co-ordinated effort to oversee its development.  Among the 
arguments offered was the fact that listeners’ increasing use of CDs and other digital 
audio devices led to audience  expectations of higher quality that only a digital system 
could provide.  Studios and many parts of the production process were undergoing a 
process of digitalization and it appeared logical that this would in due course be 
extended to the transmission system.  Technically, a digital system, it was argued, 
could provide a more robust and reliable service to the portable and mobile listener 
and in particular provide a much-improved service to the automobile listener.  A 
further incentive for broadcasters was the potential to become players in the 
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development and roll-out of digital services and considerable emphasis was given to 
the potential new revenue streams that might become available with DAB’s data 
carrying abilities.  
 
DRRI’s recommendations on programming practices for digital radio outlined 
features it was hoped would drive the development DAB and make it a highly 
attractive consumer product.6  These included a consistent approach to displaying 
station name and format and as the technology developed the opportunity to display 
logos and other graphical information; dynamic labels to display information about 
whatever is currently playing on air.  Using available data capacity, stations could also 
offer programming enhancements, interviews, breaking news, weather forecasts, 
different languages, etc. For example, if a consumer is listening to a song on air, they 
could push that station's sub-channel button to hear an interview with the artist. 
Finally, a listener access to a 'tell me more' button which would provide additional 
information about a programming feature or an advertiser, eventually leading to 
interactive e-commerce applications. 
 
Parnis (2000) attributes this aggressive and pro-active approach to a recognition 
within the radio industry that in the early to mid 1990s radio as a medium had entered 
a period of decline and could be swiftly overtaken by new digital services if it did not 
adapt to the new environment. The representative industry group, DRRI put forward 
the argument that ‘Every communication medium is embracing the superior quality 
and increased capacity made possible by digital technology. In today's competitive 
marketplace, radio must keep pace, providing the highest quality of sound and an 
array of new and appealing services that ensures that radio remain a dynamic media.’ 
In this context, DAB was represented ‘as a revolutionary audio broadcasting 
technology, which dramatically improves sound quality, and signal reliability and will 
enable you to receive a host of new services through your radio’.7   Against the 
background of increasing competition from the web and the potential threat from 
other digital audio services, DAB was heavily promoted as the best technology 
available: 
 
DAB delivers a variety of fundamental benefits. Based on Eureka 147 
technology, it has numerous advantages over both current analogue 
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transmission and the more recent audio streaming via the World Wide Web. 
"digital" offers both outstanding CD quality sound and portability. It will lead 
to host of data display services for the consumer including geographic 
positioning, traffic and weather information, advertising supplements, song 
credits and a good deal more. All the while the listener is treated to 
interference-free reception. DAB's "point to multi-point" capabilities serve to 
illustrate the Web's "point-to-point" limitations and afford digital radio stations 
the opportunity to play to a much wider audience. (Bray 2000) 
 
There were also a number of important economic arguments, from an industry point 
of view, in favour of DAB.  Following the initial investment in new transmission 
equipment, there would be greatly reduced operating costs for broadcasters given the 
much lower power requirement for DAB compared to FM and AM.  The potential for 
new pay or subscription-based services were also an important incentive as a means of 
growing radio revenues.  In addition, however, there was also a sense of the 
inevitability of the transition to digital and a fear that not being part of this would 
severely jeopardize radio’s business foundation.  As expressed by one commentator in 
2000: 
 
The success of DAB is critical to broadcast owners as the only way to protect 
the value of their properties. It is inevitable that AM and FM must give way to 
superior technology. After extensive research, the logical next step clearly 
appears to be DAB. Current license holders are the first to be granted the new 
digital licenses by the CRTC. Owners thereby continue to hold and control an 
extremely valuable portion of the broadcast "real estate". (Bray 2000)  
 
The pro-digital radio lobby in Canada could claim considerable optimism for the 
prospects for DAB in Canada in its initial inception phase.  The groundwork and 
development for DAB in Canada was described as a textbook case of cooperation 
among the many players involved (Chouinard, 1994: 79). The relatively small group 
at DRRI who pioneered and championed the cause of digital radio and DAB in 
particular, ensured that the technology had been perfected and standardized, the 
necessary spectrum had been obtained and generally a solid foundation was in place 
for large scale implementation (Edwards 2001). Once the process moved out of the 
planning phase and into domain of implementation subject to market conditions and 
consumer behaviour, it would become more diffused and uncontrolled but, it was 
hoped, with sufficient marketing, public information and availability at a reasonable 
cost, consumers would be clamouring for DAB (Bray, 2000).  
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An official launch of digital radio in Canada took place in 1999 at the convention of 
the Canadian Association of Broadcasters and a steady roll out of stations with DAB 
services proceeded in key metropolitan areas. Within a short period, there were some 
57 stations broadcasting in DAB, reaching 35 per cent of the population, some 10 
million listeners in Toronto, Montreal, Windsor, and Vancouver, with a further launch 
of  DAB services in Ottawa to follow. By 2002, the CAB’s vice president of radio 
could confidently declare that sufficient progress had been made to claim Canada’s 
emergence as a world leader in digital radio (Cavanagh, 2002: 30).  A major boost to 
the marketing of DAB was the announcement by General Motors of Canada of its 
plans to install DAB receivers as standard equipment in its vehicles for the 2003 
model year. Also in that year, DRRI commissioned an engineering study to extend the 
coverage of DAB nationally in corridors between the major metropolitan centres.  
Significant progress also appeared to be underway in receiver availability:  Radio 
Shack Canada announced it would carry a range of home and portable DAB consumer 
products across its stores.  The development of a new DAB chip by Texas Instruments 
also promised greatly reduced prices for receivers and the first DAB/FM personal 
portable dropping below the psychologically all important $100 became available.  
 
 
What went wrong for DAB in Canada? 
Despite many positive early indications, DAB in the succeeding years has clearly not 
lived up to expectations nor developed in Canada in any sustained way. Officially, 
there are currently 73 licensed DAB stations in Canada, of which 62 are fully 
operational: 25 in Toronto, 15 in Vancouver, 12 in Montreal, 6 in Windsor, and 4 in 
Ottawa serving nearly 11 million potential listeners.  However, listenership is low and 
not even monitored by BBM Canada. DAB receivers are not readily available either 
for home, portable or car use. Industry professionals are generally despondent and 
regard the ten years since 1995 when DAB was first rolled out as an unproductive, 
stalled or even failed period of development.8 In common with the experience of other 
countries, the project of digital radio based on a single platform such as Eureka-147 is 
now being called into question with little prospect of it being revived any time soon.   
There are a number of complex reasons underlying this which call into question some 
of the initial assumptions made about the roll out of DAB in Canada as well as 
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additional external factors over which it could be said there was very little control.  
From this emerge some lessons from the Canadian case which will find resonances 
elsewhere and ultimately have some important implications for the consideration of 
the digital future of radio as a medium.  Reasons underpinning the failure of DAB in 
Canada can be grouped under three headings: the lack of consumer response; sectoral 
or industry responses; and policy issues. 
 
Consumer Response 
In the first place there was a very poor consumer response to the development of DAB 
in Canada and at no time over its 10 year history could it be said that digital radio 
firmly took hold.  There was poor awareness of the service, or indeed even the 
existence of the new technology and its potential benefits for radio listening. There 
were particular difficulties with the supply of receiver equipment and it was 
erroneously assumed that a range of equipment would follow with the take up of DAB 
in Europe.  Despite the promotional activity of DRRI as the mandated body to create 
awareness of DAB and its benefits, the fact that receivers were largely unavailable or 
difficult to source proved extremely damaging to the prospects of an early take up of 
DAB.  Initial costs of around $2000 for high end consumer receivers gave DAB an 
elite, audiophile image which proved difficult to subsequently to shake off.  Lower 
cost receivers once they reached the market performed poorly adding further 
difficulties to any potential increase in supply of receiver equipment. The issue of 
receiver availability cuts to the core of the issue around digital radio in that with an 
installed based of approximately 75 million AM/FM receivers, consumers needed 
very compelling reasons to change to a new and relatively untested technology.   
 
With the poor availability of consumer receivers and in many instances poor quality 
of what was available, the much-heralded enhanced features of the digital radio 
listening experience proved to be unattainable or below expectations. The assumption 
that the promise of enhanced CD-like audio quality would be the unique selling 
feature of the new technology proved unfounded in nearly all markets and especially 
so in Canada. Some industry figures maintain that this was a failure of marketing but 
it remained a chicken and egg problem compounded by a lack of interest by 
manufacturers to invest in new product lines pending greater consumer demand.  It 
was also the case that many of the promised additional data services did not arrive 
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either with many stations sticking conservatively to a simulcast of their analogue 
services. Despite initial enthusiasm for the possibilities of data services, with the 
exception of CHUM, none really materialized. 
 
Of particular significance to the Canadian market was the ultimate failure to deliver 
DAB as a standard feature of the automobile market. Given the importance of 
automobile radio listening in North America generally, the tie-in with OEM (or 
original equipment manufacturers) for the automotive sector was crucial to the 
successful adoption of DAB. The surprise success of DRRI in getting a commitment 
from General Motors Canada for installation of DAB receivers in its 2003 models 
proved short lived when difficulties emerged over supply of equipment and 
engineering a segregation of the Canadian market for those areas where DAB was 
available.  According to DRRI’s president at the time, what General Motors required 
was a commitment and a timetable for the roll-out on a national level of DAB to 
enable them to commission digital receivers as standard equipment across their entire 
range.9  When this wasn’t forthcoming, General Motors pulled back and like the rest 
of the sector began to adopt ‘a wait and see’ approach.10  As a result, the only option 
available for DAB in-car listening was an after-market installation of a new receiver 
which proved unpopular, adding to low profile of DAB in the marketplace.   
 
Industry Support 
From a sectoral perspective, a major question mark over the decision to adopt Eureka- 
147 began to emerge once it was clear that the US were proceeding in a different 
direction. Canada’s decision to adopt L-Band DAB was made in the knowledge that 
this would not be followed in the United States as most of that spectrum was 
unavailable or already allocated for military purposes. The initial response of the 
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) in the United States to L-Band DAB 
using Eureka-147 was positive, and the system was acknowledged to have performed 
well in all tests. Difficulties began to emerge as early as 1992, however, when the 
implications of developing a replacement technology for the United States market 
were considered.  Major concern was expressed about the impact of a new technology 
on existing FM stations in the most developed markets.  Under pressure from industry 
interests, therefore, US policy was constrained by the need to develop a digital system 
that would disrupt the existing service in any way. The fact that DAB was a 
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European-originated technology ill-equipped to meet the different needs of the US 
market, 11 in addition to the potential disruptive spectrum allocation difficulties that 
might be experienced ensured that by 1992 DAB was off the agenda in the United 
States.  In due course, the adoption of IBOC, the proprietary in-band, on channel 
technical solution developed by iBiquity Digital Corporation, placed Canada and the 
US squarely at odds with radically different approaches to digital radio 
broadcasting.12  It was assumed that as radio was primarily a local medium, the fact 
that competing and incompatible systems were being used either side of the border 
would not matter in the end.  Experience has shown, however, the difficulty of 
Canada pursuing a different course to its near neighbour and without doubt the 
adoption of IBOC in the United States even with its technical limitations contributed 
to the growing unease among industry members about the wisdom of their DAB 
policy.  In spite of the fact, that the Eureka 147 DAB approach is acknowledged to be 
technically superior, many industry executives now openly admit that successful 
implementation of IBOC in the United States would present a new scenario for 
considering its suitability for Canada.   
 
An interesting argument made in favour of accepting IBOC in Canada illustrates the 
change in thinking around the transition to digital radio.13  Given the robustness of 
FM analogue broadcasting and wide consumer satisfaction with the quality it 
provides, it has been argued that IBOC may be ‘good enough’ and potentially an 
expedient and pragmatic solution to incrementally making a transition to digital 
broadcasting, while building on the success of FM.  Admittedly, IBOC has a lower 
bitrate compared to DAB and much less data handling capacity, yet for all that the 
additional features that DAB has promoted heavily have proven not to be of 
significant interest to listeners.  The IBOC solution, focuses on the core business of 
radio as transmitting localised audio programming  and if IBOC under its brand name 
of ‘HD Radio’ provides an enhanced listening experience attractive to listeners, then 
the Canadian industry would be foolish not to follow suit.  This argument would gain 
even greater urgency should IBOC prove sufficiently successful and with sufficient 
penetration of reception equipment to promote discussion of analogue switch-off date 
as is the case with digital television.   
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Further objections to DAB likewise began to be raised following DRRI’s engineering 
study to extend DAB coverage. The proposal to establish a transmission network in a 
series of corridors between major metropolitan centres in order to reach a broader 
section of the population emerged as a prohibitively expensive proposition.  Three 
corridors had been identified: in the Vancouver region; Calgary to  Edmonton; and a 
Windsor to  Quebec city corridor in order to achieve 65%  to 75% coverage of the 
Canadian population at a cost of 145 million dollars.  One of  the interesting outcomes 
from the corridor study, was that it became abundantly  clear that the kind of coverage 
achieved with L-Band DAB was very similar to the coverage of a cellular 
 infrastructure with high field strength areas near the  transmitter and then two or three 
zones of lower strength signal. The practicalities of using L-Band DAB as a 
replacement technology for the more powerful ‘C’ Class FM 100kW transmitters 
began to look more and more improbable in the Canadian topography or at least at a 
cost to coverage ratio that made little sense.14  
 
Ten years on from the formal launch of DAB as the digital standard in Canada, the 
actual level of support for the project from industry has been called into question.  
While there was strong initial enthusiasm for what DAB had to offer in the early 
1990s and a high level of initiative and support lent by private broadcasters to the 
project, its failure to take off on a more general level either internationally or in the 
Canadian market led to a gradual cooling of enthusiasm if not outright withdrawal of 
support. Once the US had decisively rejected DAB, an analogy began to be drawn 
with the ill-fated AM Stereo technology that had been unsuccessfully attempted in the 
1980s and in which the industry had suffered some major losses. Thus, psychological 
brakes began to be applied at a relatively stage despite the fact that the industry had 
agreed a digital transition policy and a strategy for its implementation.  Steve 
Edwards, one of DAB’s longtime supporters in Canada, pointedly observes that with 
all of the supposed commitment to the project, more money was spent by his company 
on upgrading a small rural station from AM to FM than was invested in ten years on 
DAB.15  The restructuring of DRRI and the effective winding up of its promotional 
and marketing activities in 2004 was formal acknowledgement of the changed attitude 
towards DAB.  Effectively subsumed within the Canadian Association of 
Broadcasters, DRRI would continue to have a monitoring and advisory role, as well as 
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a watching brief on existing L-Band spectrum allocation, but with no new initiatives 
planned for the advancement of DAB in Canada.16 
 
The overall rather restrained level of support from the industry for DAB was in 
particular evidence in the relatively low profile adopted by CBC, the national public 
broadcaster.  In contrast to the United Kingdom, where the BBC has played a leading 
role in the development and the roll out of the technology or in Singapore where the 
Singapore Broadcast Authority has likewise been to the forefront of DAB 
implementation, CBC has been a participant rather than a leader in DAB.   A member 
of the original Task Force for the Introduction of Digital Radio and a fifty per cent 
partner in DRRI, CBC was an active and equal participant in industry efforts to steer 
the sector towards the digital domain.  However, CBC was not a champion of DAB in 
the sense of pioneering new programme strategies or lending major promotional 
support to the project. DAB was effectively co-opted as one of a number of options in 
an overall new media strategy which included the web, subscription digital audio 
services via cable and more recently satellite broadcasting.  In part due to the 
downsizing of the engineering function within CBC (Lavers, 2006), the emphasis for 
the corporation was a programming one and was based on a commitment to make 
programming available across all new platforms, not just DAB.17  While CBC is now 
experimenting with newer applications such DMB (Digital Multimedia Broadcasting) 
using DAB technology, its interest in digital terrestrial radio per se has waned 
considerably.18 
 
 
Policy Considerations 
A conclusion offered by many participants in this study was that the policy developed 
for the transition to digital, while perhaps appropriate for the time, was based on a 
number of false assumptions which proved over the succeeding years to be the wrong 
decisions for the Canadian radio industry.   
 
The central feature of the policy towards a digital transition was that DAB would be a 
replacement technology for analogue AM and FM transmission. This approach was 
determined by the industry itself and had its origins in the desire to improve the 
quality of AM broadcasting which continues to be an important of the Canadian 
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broadcast landscape. Industry representatives were also concerned that unless the 
digital transition was managed on the basis of a replacement of the existing 
transmission network, a licensing round for L-Band spectrum would be likely to bring 
a series of new entrants to the marketplace who could potentially disrupt the entire 
industry. In a not dissimilar situation to the United States where incumbents based 
their entire strategy on preventing any new competition and for this reason adopted a 
system that worked within an existing waveband, the Canadian strategy was premised 
on the assumption that a rapid transition would take place and that all existing 
broadcasters would migrate to the digital domain.  
 
The regulatory framework for digital radio was based on this assumption and as a 
result ‘transitional’ licenses were issued to all incumbents  who wished to upgrade 
their transmission services to digital, on the understanding that this was for the 
purposes of simulcasting existing signals over the transitional period. However, no 
timeline was in put in place and the roll out of DAB from the start was ill-defined. 
From a regulatory point of view, the CRTC agreed a two-staged process. In the first 
instance, experimental licences granted stations the right to use a digital channel for 
simulcasting but were prohibited from using the ancillary (data) channels available for 
programming or for any service that would compete with or degrade the primary 
programming signal.  A broad process of public consultation would follow, initially 
estimated within a period of three years,  to develop the long term digital radio 
policy.19 
 
The lack of flexibility given to experimentation with new content derived in part from 
ownership rules governing radio in Canada which restricts companies from owning 
more than two AM and two FM holdings in any one market.  The transitional licence 
was not considered an additional service for ownership purposes, at least for the 
transitional period.  Substantial new programming would however constitute a new 
service and incumbents who wished to develop new digital-only services would have 
to relinquish some of their valuable existing analogue services. The CRTC having 
granted incumbents priority access to new digital channels in the first place could not 
increase that allocation further for the purposes of experimental digital programming 
and, in any event, had to protect the public interest and ensure diversity in the 
broadcast landscape.  What has emerged subsequently is a form of regulatory 
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paralysis with an initial allocation of spectrum and licensing and no further room for 
manoeuvre until substantial progress has been made in the development of a proven 
service.   
 
This transitional regime has in effect continued to the present and no consultative 
process of long term strategy for digitalization has ever been instituted.  The 
restrictions placed on experimental licences remain in effect, preventing the 
development of new programming services and limiting additional content to alpha-
numeric text.  Few, if any, new entrants have been licensed and the lack of any 
permanent licensing structure has meant a lack of interest on the part of investors in 
developing new digital services on the DAB platform.   
 
The issue of stand-alone licences for DAB has been a contentious one and illustrates 
the kind of stalemate that the industry as a whole is experiencing on its digital policy. 
Interestingly, the pressure for additional, digital only licences has come not from 
within the mainstream broadcast sector  but from the field of ethnic broadcasting. 
With an expanding diverse and multicultural population in each of its major cities, 
there has been an ongoing and increasing demand for the provision of new ethnic 
broadcast services.20   Over half the population of the greater metropolitan area of 
Toronto, for instance, is comprised of ethnically diverse communities with some 55 
distinct ethnic groups in over 45 languages.  While currently there are 6 full service 
ethnic radio stations, there is enormous demand for new services.  Additional niche 
ethnic broadcasting has been provided by the use of SCMO (subsidiary 
communications multiplex operation) services, using ancillary spectrum capacity 
available on FM and leased by existing broadcast licence holders. Special receiving 
equipment is required for the service but its success as demonstrated by the 12 SCMO 
operations in the Greater Toronto Area has shown the potential of new channels using 
dedicated technology for specific niche applications or community uses.   
 
In 2003, the first stand-alone DAB radio service, Sur Sagar Radio Inc. was licensed in 
the Toronto areas to deliver a service aimed at the South Asian community in the 
region, broadcasting in Punjabi, Hindi, Urdu and Gujarati, as well as English. The 
CAB objected to the license application on the basis that stand-alone licences were 
not appropriate given the embryonic stage of the DAB sector.21  The CAB feared, and 
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argued as such with the CRTC, that opening up the licensing of stand-alone digital 
stations would initiate a ‘gold rush’ for spare spectrum, before the business case had 
been established or proven.  It appealed again to the market-driven approach outlined 
in the Policy for the Introduction of Digital Radio (1995) which protected the current 
structure of the industry pending a full and complete transition to digital.   In reply, 
Sur Sagar argued that a new approach to digital radio was now required which would 
be based on programme innovation, and risks being taken by new entrants to the 
market in order to counteract the stalled implementation of digital radio.  In strongly 
worded terms, Sur Sagar argued that the spectrum was “public property, not the 
private reserve of those who have experimented.”  The CRTC’s supported the case 
and justified a one-off licence on the basis that “offering an entire schedule of unique 
programming for a specialised audience adds value to digital radio and could advance 
the rollout of the special receiver necessary to receive such programming.”22   This 
was an important decision and one which could have important consequences for a 
reorientation of DAB policy.  Operational difficulties have to date however hindered 
the development of the Sur Sagar service and the success of its implementation 
remains uncertain.23 
 
A coda of sorts to this phase of DAB in Canada is provided by the proposal of CHUM 
Ltd., the Canadian communications conglomerate, to provide a subscription radio 
service across Canada on a DAB network. Satellite radio made a high profile entry 
into the Canadian market in 2005 when both XM and Sirius platforms were licensed 
to operate their subscription service under revised Canadian broadcasting 
regulations.24 With knowledge of the impending entry of both satellite giants, a third 
application for a terrestrial digital subscription service was submitted by CHUM and 
also approved though subsequently never launched.   Controversially, where the bulk 
of the satellite’s music service of over 100 channels was not subject to the normal 
Canadian content regulations, CHUM’s proposal as a terrestrial service was licensed 
under the normal content rules for all Canadian broadcast services.  
 
CHUM’s proposal was for a terrestrial DAB service with conditional access, and 
providing 50 channels initially, subsequently growing to 100 channels  for a $9.95 
CDN monthly subscription. CHUM signed a technology agreement with RadioScape 
in the UK to develop receivers specifically for the subscription service which could 
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also be used to pick up regular, non-subscription DAB channels. Receivers would also 
include a card slot for adding removable memory for recording, a RAM cache for 
live-pause and replay features, and an integrated receiver/MP3 player, designed 
specifically for the youth market. In order to achieve the density required to allow a 
50  channel service in addition to current DAB allocations for AM and FM 
replacement, the data compression ratios would be reduced to 128 kbps for stereo 
from its current 256 kilobits per second.  More advanced codecs providing an 
approximate doubling of spectral efficiency), and /or the allocation of a "modest 
amount" of additional spectrum beyond the current 1452-1492 MHz DAB band were 
also proposed (Pizzi 2005). 
 
CHUM’s submission argued that its proposal would work with conventional radio by 
acting as a complementary service, providing a platform for greater industry 
involvement as content partners and, crucially, would play an instrumental role in 
driving penetration of digital radio by bringing to market affordable and 
technologically advanced receivers. Citing the contrast with the UK, where DAB has 
been a success story, CHUM argued that the missing Canadian element was content  
and that this proposal contained the appropriate mix of innovative, Canadian-
produced content to drive a successful digital transition.  
 
CHUM’s service is a really a case of ‘what might have been’ and much of the 
industry response to the proposal considered it a ‘spoiler’ application against the two 
dominant satellite bids which had already made inroads into the Canadian market.25  
While it addressed salient issues in respect of Canada’s policy in digital radio and 
offered a pro-Canadian solution to leading the digital transition, the response of the 
regulator, which was to effectively let the market decide, underlined the weakness of 
the Canadian position in digital radio.  Decisive intervention in progressing the digital 
transition was effectively led by developments in the US, initially by its rejection of 
DAB and development of an in-band solution and subsequently with the 
encroachment of US satellite footprints on the Canadian marketplace.  The fact that 
no special protection was afforded the Canadian approach in 2005 effectively spelt the 
end of the strategy of migrating the industry onto the Eureka 147 platform. 
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Future Options for DAB 
Summing up what has been a long and unproductive ten years since the initial 
introduction of DAB into Canada, one radio executive candidly remarked: 
 
I believe it was a waste of time and money and we are still  sitting here with 
nothing. I never understood (it). I said from day one there's  no indication that 
consumers want replacement technology.  They don't see  our signal being as 
bad as we think they think it is. And I don’t think  we ever researched it 
correctly. In terms of our plan which was always to  put our existing stations 
on a new platform and transition - waste of  time, money and no demand.26  
 
 
Michael McEwen, former CBC radio executive and past president of the World DAB 
Forum, described four conditions required for a successful transition to digital.  The 
first condition is spectrum availability for the proposed new digital transmission 
environment.  The second is a commitment from broadcasters to fill that  spectrum.  
Thirdly, listeners need a value-added incentive to buy into the service with enhanced 
programming, data and ancillary services.  And finally, a commitment is needed from 
the consumer electronics industry to ensure a near-ubiquitous supply of consumer 
electronic devices at affordable consumer prices. Unless these four conditions were 
met, each would in some way become a barrier to a successful transition.  In the case 
of Canada, it could be argued that there was market failure in three out of the four.27  
The assumption that the superior audio quality of DAB alone would drive the 
transition from analogue to digital, as CD had achieved a replacement of vinyl, was 
unfounded.  Analogue broadcasting and FM in particular have proved remarkably 
robust and its quality such that the differentiation between DAB and good quality FM 
was not significant.  Rather than replacement of one platform for another, the 
experience has in fact been over the period concerned an insatiable demand for new 
and additional services to the extent that capacity, particularly in FM, has been 
reached in most major markets.   
 
Despite this, most executives agree that DAB will have some role in the future of 
digital radio in Canada.  If for no other reason than the fact that a network is in place 
and stations have been allocated valuable shares of L-Band spectrum, there is a sense 
that a number of potential future applications are possible for DAB in Canada.  
Following the lead of the proposed CHUM digital subscription service, many of the 
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leading players in what is now a highly converged radio sector with four main 
corporations controlling the vast bulk of the industry are now well positioned to 
introduce new, value-added additional services as a spin-off from conventional core 
broadcasting business. The regulatory provision does not at present provide for such 
applications and given strict ownership rules operators are disincentivised from 
deviating from analogue broadcasting.  
 
In its long promised review of the commercial radio sector, the CRTC has now 
formally incorporated a review of the transitional digital radio policy and called for 
submissions different aspects of the 1995 policy.28  Acknowledging the stalled switch-
over, the CRTC asks whether the replacement strategy should now be reconsidered 
and if so what the status of existing DAB stations now in operation should be. It asks 
whether the policy should now be modified to enable new entrants into the market, 
specifically if digital radio could provide better services for diverse cultural and ethnic 
communities, and how additional DAB spectrum might be obtained or made 
available.  However, DAB is no longer treated as the sole transitional digital platform 
and the policy framework now directly address the issue of whether IBOC should be 
permitted in Canada as well as asking what provision should be made for other 
standards, such as DRM, DMB, and DVB-H. In addition, new and emerging Internet 
distribution platforms such file-sharing, podcasting, downloading, and audio 
streaming, including fixed locations and wireless systems such as Wi-Fi and WiMAX 
and the promise of Internet-based services for car reception, all radically change the 
nature of any proposed digital transition.  In the words of the commission, ‘the new 
audio programming alternatives pose an unprecedented challenge for the conventional 
radio sector that will require astute business decisions and a judicious regulatory 
approach’.29 
 
In its submission to the CRTC, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters supports the 
abandonment of the ‘replacement technology’ notion of digital radio broadcasting and 
advocates a flexible regulatory approach as the central element of a re-vamped policy 
for digital radio.30  A long term strategy is required, the CAB argue, to ensure that 
radio services of national, regional and local interest, will continue to be delivered 
reliably and free of charge to fixed, portable and mobile services.  The digital 
transition policy, therefore, remains crucially important when set against a 
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background of declining audiences particularly among younger listeners for 
conventional radio, as well as the ongoing fragmentation of the market by 
unregulated, Internet-delivered audio services.  Flexible arrangements enabling 
stations to experiment with innovative programming models and ideas would, it is 
argued, provide a much needed boost for attracting listeners to digital and should 
include a relaxation of Canadian content regulations for digital services, at least until 
meaningful listenership levels were achieved, and more flexible consideration of 
ownership rules, enabling stations to experiment on their digital services without 
having to relinquish an equivalent property. While new programming is proposed as a 
driver for any new impetus on the terrestrial digital radio broadcasting, simulcasting 
as appropriate is also envisaged as a means of encouraging migration of analogue to 
digital.   The analogy is drawn with the migration of AM to FM in the 1950s and 60s 
whereby a gradual increase of peak-listening programming was successfully 
transferred to the FM band, once initial listenership began to take hold. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the CAB argue that incumbents are best positioned to provide 
programming services and advocate continued priority given to existing broadcasters 
to digital allocations.  However, new entrants are acknowledged to have a role and a 
mechanism for releasing unused spectrum by current licence-holders is proposed.  
More efficient use of the spectrum whether through AAC source coding and/or 
reviewing the current generous data rates of 256 kbits/sec would also free up 
considerable room for expansion and enable the kind of quantity envisaged for digital 
programming services on a par with equivalent Internet or satellite-based services.  
 
Prior to the formation of new Canada-wide policy for digital broadcasting, it is 
accepted that there is now no longer one simple solution.  As the CAB argue in their 
submission: 
 
It is simply not realistic to assume that a successful digital transition will be no 
more than the replacement of the existing business with minor additions and 
adjustments. Nor does digital transition necessarily mean the destruction of the 
old business and the creation of a new one.31 
 
 
A successful transition to digital in the Canadian context will be based on a ‘good 
value proposition’ that includes new content, affordable receivers, promotion, and 
competitive technical features. It will continue to include DAB as part of the equation 
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but one which is as likely to include variants of the Eureka 147 system, as well 
options for IBOC, Internet distribution and technologies for distribution to hand-held 
mobile devices.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing together the many different issues that have arisen over the course of the 
transitional digital radio era in Canada, the following may be advanced as some of the 
over-riding lessons of the Canadian experience. 
 
1. In the first instance, the experience of Canada in attempting to implement 
DAB illustrates the classic disadvantage of being an early adopter of new 
technologies.  Canada’s early and leading role in DAB implementation was 
well established. It participated actively in the World DAB forum, a leading 
Canadian executive serving as President, as well as in the respective technical 
standards groups. It succeeded in galvanising wide industry support including 
relevant government, private and public broadcaster interest and developed a 
coherent strategy based on the information available at the time and the 
context in which radio operated.  However, as discussed in the foregoing, all 
of this came to nought with the lack of availability of receivers and insufficient 
development of receiver technology. 
 
2. The second lesson that can be drawn from the Canadian experience is its 
illustration of the difficulty of the broadcast regulatory regime or framework 
keeping pace with technological change. Canada’s transitional digital radio 
policy was set in 1995 and based solely around the implementation of DAB as 
a replacement technology AM and FM.  It did not, or could not, take account 
then or subsequently of the increasingly complex technological domain that 
broadcasting was facing, including the development of IBOC in the US, 
advances in compression technologies for transmission, Internet distribution 
and new developments in multimedia broadcasting. The regulatory gap was 
particularly exposed with the launch of satellite radio and the manner in which 
it made its entry into the Canadian broadcast environment.  The licensing of 
the XM and Sirius satellite platforms showed how unprepared the Canadian 
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system was for effectively predatory encroachments on platforms that had not 
been previously planned for.   
 
3. It might be argued that the example of how the digital transition has been 
handled in Canada points up the weakness of a laissez-faire or market-driven 
approach.  The regulatory position of the CRTC combines a responsibility to 
defend the public interest as well as to respond to the business needs of the 
sector. Its transitional digital radio policy was based on facilitating an 
industry-led initiative on the road ahead. The disadvantages of this approach 
have already been discussed with particular reference to the potential conflicts 
involved when incumbents have responsibility for developing long term 
policy.   Neither the regulator nor the public broadcaster in the Canadian 
example intervened to adopt a more direct or leadership role in the roll-out of 
a digital policy.  This, arguably, is in contrast to the more successful 
interventionist approach adopted in the UK.   
 
4. Fourthly, as illustrated by the Canadian experience, the transition to digital 
broadcasting is not simply one of replacement technology. Where the debate 
up to and including 1995 envisaged a total migration of the radio broadcasting 
landscape onto a fully digital system, the reality has been shown to be much 
more complex. Unlike the case of television where there is an industry  
momentum towards realising a digital system and a gathering consensus 
around analogue switch-off deadlines, the same can not be said for radio.  
Digital broadcasting for the foreseeable future will be complementary to 
conventional analogue broadcasting and its strategy will be tailored as such. 
 
5. As a follow up, it can be seen from the case of digital radio in Canada that 
analogue broadcasting and FM in particular has proved to be remarkably 
robust, reliable and successful as a means of providing free to air broadcast 
services. The supposed greatly enhanced audio quality of DAB was not 
sufficient or sufficiently significant to enable the digital transition in Canada.  
With a huge installed user base of at least 70 million receivers in Canada, as 
well as considering the ease with which FM receivers can be incorporated into 
cell phones and mobile devices, it will be a considerable time before the issue 
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of replacement returns to the agenda. Indeed, in contrast to many European 
markets, the Canadian radio market shows how underdeveloped many FM 
markets are in the European context and scope that exists for further 
development.  
 
6. As shown in other markets also, Canada is further proof of the 
acknowledgment that the transition to digital radio will take longer than any 
one originally thought.   
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